Philosophy 1110 (Introduction to Philosophy) YalÁûn

Idealism

Master argument:

An idealist is a monist who believes that there is only mental stuff in the universe--matter does not exist. Berkeleyπs argument for idealism is one of the most well-known, and most discussed arguments for idealism (although it is not necessarily the best). Here is how Berkeley puts it in his own words:

≥But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose; it only shews you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind: but it does not shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas.≤ (A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, paragraph 23)

Berkeleyπs argument:

(1) The concept of matter is (among other things) the concept of a mind-independent stuff

(2) If the concept of matter is coherent, it should be possible to imagine a material object no one is aware of.

(3) But, it is impossible to imagine a material object no one is aware of, because in the act of imagining it, one becomes aware of it (you ≥see≤ it in your mindπs eye)

(4) The concept of matter is not coherent

(5) Matter cannot exist

The problem with this ingeniuous argument lies in premise (3), and precisely with the claim that ≥in the act of imagining an object, one becomes aware of it≤. Here are two reasons why this claim is incorrect:

(a) If we keep in mind the distinction between the representing symbol and the represented object, we should say that in the act of imagining an object, one becomes aware of the representing symbol, but not the represented object. That is, when I imagine, by visualizing, my dream house (which I have not yet seen or bought), I am not aware of the house (the object), which might not even exist--I am only aware of the mental representation or symbol I have of it.

(b) There is a distinction also between generically thinking of an X, and thinking of a specific X. When I say ≥I am thinking now of the first baby that will be born in the year 2000≤, I am thinking generically of the first baby that will be born in the year 2000--and it does not make sense for you to ask me: ≥Is it a boy or a girl≤?. But if I indeed become acquainted with the first baby that will be born in the year 2000, I might specifically think of it (≥Wasnπt she cute≤) and, then, such a question becomes apposite. Similarly, when I think of a tree no one is aware of, this is generic thinking, and there is no tree I am specifically aware of.